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I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal government’s power to punish crimes has drastically 
expanded in the past few decades as improved telecommunications 
and transportation networks have turned more crimes into interstate 
affairs.1 This expansion of the federal government’s authority to 
regulate crime conflicts with the traditional division of power, in 
which states regulate most crimes.2 The tension between the federal 
government’s law enforcement authority and its limited powers is 
apparent in United States v. Comstock.3 This case is about how far the 
Constitution will allow the federal government to go in preventing 
crime. In Comstock, the Supreme Court will consider whether the 
federal government has the authority to indefinitely civilly commit 
sexually dangerous4 federal offenders who are already in federal 
custody.5 At the heart of Comstock is a question of whether Congress 
has the power to civilly commit prisoners as “sexually dangerous” 
regardless of whether they are imprisoned for committing a sex crime. 
* 2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Counterrevolution—National Criminal Law After Raich, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 986 (2005) (stating that “there has been a veritable explosion in the number 
of federal criminal laws over the last half century”); Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing 
Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 826 (2000) (estimating that there are more than 
3600 federal crimes, 40% of which have been enacted since 1970). 
 2. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (describing state authority to protect 
the community from the mentally ill; see also Ehrlich, supra note 1, at 826–27. 
 3. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2828 (2009). 
 4. See infra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text (defining sexually dangerous). 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224 (U.S. Apr. 
3, 2009). 
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Congressional power to civilly commit potentially dangerous 
people is limited by the Necessary and Proper Clause because the 
Constitution does not explicitly authorize civil commitments.6 
Congress can only provide for civil commitments when they are 
necessary and proper to an action justified by one of Congress’ 
enumerated powers.7 Whether Congress had the power to provide for 
civil commitment of the sexually dangerous could ultimately depend 
on which power the Court holds that Congress’ action was founded 
on. If the Court holds that the civil commitment law is based on 
Congress’ commerce power, the law will probably be unconstitutional 
because sexual dangerousness falls outside the scope of the 
Commerce Clause. If the Court holds that the law is founded on 
Congress’ penal power, the law will probably be constitutional 
because civil commitment is necessary and proper to the function of a 
federal penal system. 
II. FACTS 
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
(the “Act”) with the aim of “protecting children from sexual 
exploitation and violent crime.”8 Section 4248 of the Act authorizes 
the federal government to civilly commit any sexually dangerous 
person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in a federal 
facility.9 
United States v. Comstock consolidates five individuals’ 
constitutional challenges to the Act.10 The lead plaintiff, Graydon 
Comstock, pled guilty to receipt of child pornography.11 Six days 
before the end of his thirty-seven month prison sentence, the 
Attorney General certified him as sexually dangerous and stayed his 
release from prison.12 The cases of three of the four other parties 
(Markis Revland, Thomas Matherly, and Marvin Vigil) followed a 
similar trajectory; the government certified each for civil commitment 
 6. See U.S. CONST., art I § 8 (ommitting civil commitment from the list of enumerated 
powers). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 17. 
 8. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587, 587 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2009). 
 10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 9. 
 11. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2009) cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2828 (2009). 
 12. Id. 
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less than one month before each man completed his prison term.13 
More than two years after the expiration of their prison terms, all four 
are still in the medium security Federal Correctional Institute in 
Butner, N.C.14 
The fifth respondent, Shane Catron, was found incompetent to 
stand trial on charges of sexual abuse of a minor.15 After he was 
committed for treatment and evaluation to determine his likelihood 
to attain competency for trial, the government concluded that he 
could not be restored to competency.16 The government then moved 
to commit him under § 4248 as a person suffering from mental 
disease.17 
Each respondent moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds, 
relying on the government’s lack of authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the federal power to prosecute and prevent 
criminal conduct, and the Commerce Clause.18 The Eastern District of 
North Carolina agreed, holding that § 4248 was not sufficiently tied to 
an enumerated power.19 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. §4248 and Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person 
Section 4248 authorizes the government to civilly commit 
“sexually dangerous” federal prisoners and other “sexually 
dangerous” people in federal custody,20 a power that permits the 
federal government to extend the imprisonment of people it believes 
will commit sex crimes in the future. Under § 4248, three categories of 
people are subject to civil commitment: 1) those in the custody of the 
Bureau of Prisons; 2) those committed to the custody of the U.S. 
Attorney General based on incompetence to stand trial; and 3) those 
who have had their charges  “dismissed solely for reasons relating to 
 13. Id. at 277–78. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10. 
 16. Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d) (West 2009) (describing procedure for 
“determination of mental competency to stand trial to undergo postrelease proceedings”). 
 17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10; see also § 4246 (describing the 
procedure for “hospitalization of a person due for release but suffering from mental disease or 
defect”). 
 18. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530–40 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d 551 F.3d 
274 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 19. Id. at 559. 
 20. § 4248(a). 
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the[ir] mental condition.”21 
Civil commitment under § 4248 begins with a finding by the 
Attorney General that a qualifying prisoner or detainee is sexually 
dangerous.22 To qualify as sexually dangerous, the prisoner or detainee 
must have “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent 
conduct or child molestation”23 and “[suffer] from a serious mental 
illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have 
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation if released.”24 The Attorney General can make these 
findings even if the prisoner or detainee has not been convicted of a 
sex crime.25 
Once the Attorney General determines that a prisoner is sexually 
dangerous, the prisoner’s release from federal custody is stayed and 
proceedings to review the Attorney General’s determination begin.26 
The prisoner is entitled to counsel, and can testify, present evidence, 
subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine witnesses who 
appear against him at the hearing.27 If the government proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual is sexually dangerous, the 
prisoner is committed to the civil custody of the U.S. Attorney 
General,28 where he will remain until: 1) a court determines that he is 
not sexually dangerous; 2) a court determines that he will not be 
sexually dangerous to others if released under an appropriate care 
regimen; or 3) the state in which he is (or was) domiciled agrees to 
take custody of him.29 Thus, the federal government does not decide 
whether the person remains in federal custody; if the state assumes 
responsibility, the prisoner must be relinquished to state custody for 
the state to try or imprison him.30 
B. Justification for §4248. 
The government justifies §4248 in two different ways. First, it says 
that § 4248 is necessary and proper to Congress’ authority to enact 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. § 4247(a)(5). 
 24. § 4247(a)(6). 
 25. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. § 4248(c). 
 28. § 4248(d). 
 29. Id. 
 30. § 4248(g). 
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laws regarding subjects within its enumerated powers.31 Second, the 
government contends that Congress’s power to operate a federal 
penal system includes the power to civilly commit dangerous 
offenders within the penal system.32 
Under the first argument, Congress must show that it has the 
authority to regulate sexually dangerous acts. The most logical source 
of authority to do so is the Commerce Clause.33 To regulate sexually 
dangerous acts under the Commerce Clause, Congress must show that 
sexually dangerous acts substantially affect interstate commerce.34 
Whether Congress can show that is unclear in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Morrison35 and 
Gonzales v 36
The Court’s Morrison decision, standing alone, tends to indicate 
that Congress cannot regulate sexual violence.37 In Morrison the 
Supreme Court articulated a four-factor test to determine an activity 
is substantially related to interstate commerce.38 The Court looks at 
whether the regulated activity is economic in nature: if it is, the 
activity is more likely to fall under the commerce power.39 The 
Morrison test also asks whether the statute’s reach is limited by an 
express jurisdictional element; the activity is more likely to be within 
the scope of the commerce power if the statute contains a 
jurisdictional limitation.40 The Court held that the Commerce Clause 
did not give Congress the power to give all victims of sex crimes a 
federal cause of action because sexual violence was not an activity 
 31. Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224 (U.S. Aug. 
28, 2009). 
 32. Id. at 22. 
 33. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution? 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880, 890 n.79 (2005) (criticizing the Court’s post-
1942 “‘channels’ and ‘instrumentalities theories’” of the Commerce Clause as allowing Congress 
to regulate anyone or anything that could move across state lines). 
 34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 35. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 36. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); see also Miles Coleman, Note, Unwanted 
Advances: Civil Commitment and Congress’s Illicit Use of the Commerce Clause —United States 
v. Comstock, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1226 (2009). (describing the scholarly divide over whether 
Raich contradicts or elaborates on the Rehnquist’s prior Commerce Clause decisions). 
 37. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16 (discussing gender-motivated violence as too 
attenuated to interstate commerce to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce power). 
 38. See id. (holding that the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded 
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because violence against women did not substantially 
affect interstate commerce). 
 39. Id. at 610. 
 40. Id. at 611. 
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that substantially affected interstate commerce.41 In so holding, the 
Court explicitly rejected Congressional findings that sexual violence 
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.42 Though the 
Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to create a cause 
of action for all victims of sex crimes, the Court indicated that it might 
give Congress the power to provide a cause of action of victims of 
interstate sex crimes.43 
The Court’s decision in Raich, however, indicates that certain 
activities that would generally be called noneconomic can still be 
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause if the regulation 
is part of a broader regulatory scheme of interstate commerce.44 The 
Court held that even though marijuana was being grown for personal 
consumption, Congress could regulate it because regulation was 
necessary to protect the federal government’s effort to eliminate the 
market for illegal drugs.45 The Court also held that legislative action 
taken under the Commerce Clause is presumed constitutional so long 
as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.46 Though 
the decision focused on illegal drugs, the Court’s logic might be broad 
enough to justify regulation of other non-economic activities—
including perhaps certain kinds of sexual violence. 
The government’s second argument is that § 4248 is a necessary 
and proper exercise of Congress’ penal power.47 Though the 
Constitution does not explicitly provide Congress with the authority 
to create and run a penal system, it is well established that the power 
to establish a penal system is a necessary and proper extension of 
Congress’s authority to establish federal criminal laws under its other 
enumerated powers.48 Though the extent of the government’s penal 
power is not well-defined, the Supreme Court has indicated 
Congress’s penal power includes the power to civilly commit 
prisoners.49 
Though Congress can civilly commit prisoners, it is not clear how 
broad the power is. Thus far, the Supreme Court has only upheld civil 
 41. Id. at 616. 
 42. Id. at 613–14. 
 43. Id. at 616 
 44. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2000) (finding that a federal legislative 
scheme exists to regulate the sale and use of marijuana). 
 45. Id. 
 46. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 47. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22–23. 
 48. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–18 (1819). 
 49. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956). 
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commitment regimes for criminal defendants found incompetent to 
stand trial50 and criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of 
insanity.51 Initially, the basis for these civil commitment regimes was 
quite narrow. In Greenwood v. United States, the Court held that the 
government could civilly commit of defendants found incompetent to 
stand trial because the federal power to prosecute had not been 
exhausted.52 Over the years, however, the Court has indicated that the 
government’s power to civilly commit defendants might be broader 
than Greenwood indicated. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Court recast 
Greenwood as a decision allowing the government to civilly commit 
mentally incompetent individuals who pose a danger to the public.53 A 
few years later, in Jones v. United States, the Court held that the 
federal government could civilly commit defendants found to be not 
guilty by reason of insanity in order to protect the defendant and 
society from potential dangerousness.54 
C. Conflicting Interpretations of Constitutionality 
Other than Comstock, the only circuit to consider the 
constitutionality of § 4248 was the Eighth Circuit in United States v. 
Tom.55 Tom was serving a federal prison sentence for traveling 
between states with the intention of engaging in a sexual act with a 
minor.56 Two days before his prison sentence ended, the government 
petitioned to have Tom civilly committed under §4248.57 
The Eighth Circuit upheld §4248 as necessary and proper to 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to prevent interstate 
sex crimes.58 Because Tom was convicted under a statute that was 
distinctly within Congress’ commerce authority, the Eighth Circuit 
held that civil commitment under § 4248 was a rational and 
appropriate means for effectuating the purpose of that statute.59 The 
Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Congress had the authority to 
enact the statute under which Tom was convicted, the “underlying 
 50. Id. at 375. 
 51. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 52. Greenwood, 350 U.S at 375. 
 53. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732–33 (1972). 
 54. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
 55. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 56. Id. at 498. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 506. 
 59. Id. at 504–06 (referring to federal sex crime statute 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c), which 
requires interstate travel). 
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federal criminal law would be frustrated” absent the ability to prevent 
the occurrence of sex crimes via the civil commitment provision.60 The 
Eighth Circuit noted that although §4248 itself does not require a 
finding that the prisoner will commit a federal sex crime, its limitation 
to those who have been charged with a federal crime and have a 
propensity for committing sexually violent acts rendered it narrow 
enough to be necessary and proper to validly enacted federal sex 
crime statutes.61 
IV. HOLDING 
In United States v. Comstock, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
statute was not based in Congress’s commerce power or justified by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.62 
The Fourth Circuit held that Congress did not have the power 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate sexual acts, thereby rejecting 
the government’s argument that § 4248 is a necessary and proper 
extension of Congress’ alleged power to regulate sexually dangerous 
acts.63 The court also reasoned that “sexual dangerousness” is in no 
way economic activity, therefore the Commerce Clause did not 
apply.64 
The Fourth Circuit then held that the civil commitment regime 
could not be justified as a necessary and proper extension of 
Congress’ penal power,65 reasoning that § 4248 lacked a connection to 
federal law because a determination of sexual dangerousness requires 
no conduct in violation of federal law.66 In making this holding, the 
court held that Congress’s penal power only permitted the 
government to civilly commit individuals when it is necessary to 1) 
prevent federal crimes67 or 2) preserve the power to prosecute 
criminals.68 
 60. Id. at 504–05. 
 61. Id. at 505–06. 
 62. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 63. Id. at 279–80. 
 64. Id. at 280. 
 65. Id. at 281. 
 66. Id. at 283. 
 67. See id. at 281–82 (rejecting the Necessary and Proper Clause as justification for 
preventing all potential future criminal conduct). 
 68. See id. (reasoning that because “the Government ha[d] already charged, tried, and 
convicted” those subject to § 4248, the power to civilly commit the defendants was exhausted). 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. Weaknesses in the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion Under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion takes an overly narrow view of the 
civil commitments Congress can authorize under its penal power. As 
Jones indicates, the federal government need not show that an inmate 
in its custody will commit another federal crime to justify civil 
commitment—in some cases civil commitment can be justified by 
showing there is reason to believe that the inmate will be a danger to 
society if released.69 By rejecting the possibility that Congress can 
authorize the attorney general to civilly commit sexually dangerous 
offenders, the Fourth Circuit failed to sufficiently consider the more 
difficult question raised by the previous Supreme Court cases: could 
the protectionist justification that permits civil commitment of those 
found not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial be 
applied to those who are sane enough to be found guilty and serve 
prison time? 
The power the government wields under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is accepted as broad.70 Where Congress has the power 
to criminalize and punish conduct, it should have the power to pass 
laws reasonably related to the prevention of regulated conduct.71 As it 
is necessary and proper to the penal power to commit people found 
not guilty by reason of mental incapacity in order to protect the 
community,72 it is logical that it is also necessary and proper to 
commit those found guilty to effectuate the same purpose. The 
difference between the civilly committed and the imprisoned seems to 
be the level of mental disturbance. If, as in Jones, the defendant is 
deemed mentally incompetent, he will be civilly committed.73 If, as in 
Comstock, the defendant is competent enough to stand trial and is 
found guilty, he will serve time in prison.74 However, this distinction 
between competent and incompetent is artificial considered that even 
 69. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). 
 70. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Houston, E. 
and W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S 342, 353 (1914) (noting that the Necessary and Proper 
clause has broad scope when used in conjunction with the Commerce Clause); see also N.L.R.B. 
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38 (1937) (stating that the Necessary and Proper 
clause’s broad scope is not limited to effectuating the Commerce power). 
 71. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 504–05 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 72. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368. 
 73. Id. at 370. 
 74. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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the truly “mentally disturbed” are often deemed “sane” enough to 
serve prison time for their crimes.75 If the difference between the 
civilly committed and the imprisoned is their level of sanity, not their 
level of sexual dangerousness, the community deserves protection 
from both groups. Because it is necessary and proper to the penal 
power to civilly commit sexually dangerous offenders found 
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, it is also 
necessary and proper to the federal government’s penal power to 
commit offenders found guilty in order to protect against sexual 
dangerousness. 
If § 4248 had actually violated federalist principles by encroaching 
on states’ police powers, the Fourth Circuit’s decision would be more 
understandable. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is problematic because 
it did not give enough weight to § 4248’s limitation to federal 
prisoners.76 Section 4248 does not expand the government’s power to 
civilly commit people in state custody; what it does is give the federal 
government the power to ensure that individuals in federal custody 
do not pose a danger to society upon release.77 That the federal 
offenders are in lawful federal custody upon their determination of 
sexual dangerousness ensures that Congress is not overstepping its 
constitutional boundaries by attempting to civilly commit individuals 
subject to the states’ police powers. 
B.  Weaknesses in the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion Under the Commerce 
Clause. 
In holding that Congress could not enact §4248 under the 
Commerce Clause, the Fourth Circuit gave too much weight to the 
general noneconomic nature of sexual violence.78 It should have given 
more weight to the statute’s limited scope79 and the fact that § 4248 is 
 75. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (describing the test for 
competency which requires that the defendant have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him and that the defendant have the ability to consult with his lawyer 
regarding the proceedings). 
 76. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 283 (describing only the lack of limitation to commercial or 
interstate activities, but not discussing the statute’s limitation solely to federal prisoners or 
detainees). 
 77. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–50 (1987) (describing the government’s 
interest in preventing crime by arrestees as legitimate and compelling). See also Brief for United 
States, supra note 31, at 37–38 (describing the federal government’s obligation to protect society 
from those prisoners in its custody). 
 78. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279. 
 79. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(a) (West 2009) (limiting the jurisdiction of § 4248 to those 
people already in custody of the Bureau of Prisons, those for whom criminal charges have been 
130 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:120 
 
part of a broader federal regulatory scheme.80 Those two things, when 
considered in proper context, might have led the Fourth Circuit to 
hold that regulating sexual dangerousness is a Constitutional exercise 
of Congress’ commerce power. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision that §4248 was not a proper exercise 
of the Commerce power was based on its decision that the logic of 
Morrison controlled.81 Even if the logic of Morrison did control, § 
4248 contains the requisite jurisdictional limitation, as the statute is 
limited solely to federal prisoners or detainees.82 However, Morrison 
did not necessarily control in this case because it is possible to 
conclude that § 4248 is part of a federal regulatory scheme for sexual 
dangerousness.83 
If § 4248 were part of a broader regulatory scheme, then the logic 
of United States v. Raich would control.84 The breadth of the Adam 
Walsh Act and the Act’s national registration requirements for sex 
offenders85 imply that the federal government has an interstate 
scheme in place regulating sexual violence. Because the federal 
government requires offenders to register their permanent 
whereabouts,86 it is clear that the government is keeping track of 
sexual offenders. The Act also categorizes sexual offenders according 
to the severity of their offenses87 and makes registration information 
including categorization available to the public.88 Thus, the Act 
requires certain activities of sexual offenders in order to both educate 
the public about and decrease sexual violence. When reviewed under 
Raich, § 4248 could thus be a justifiable exercise of Congress’ 
commerce power as Congressional actions regulate the activities of 
sexual offenders. 
dismissed due to mental conditions, or those whom the Attorney General deemed mentally 
incompetent); see also Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279 (focusing on § 4248’s lack of a physical 
jurisdictional limitation but not addressing the limitation solely to prisoners or detainees). 
 80. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (West 2009) (requiring registration for sex offenders traveling in 
interstate commerce). 
 81. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279–80. 
 82. § 4248(a) 
 83. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280 n.6 (stating there is no federal scheme regulating sexual 
violence). 
 84. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–24 (2005) (describing the need for a broad 
interstate regulatory scheme when the activity being regulated is local). 
 85. See § 2250 (requiring registration for sex offenders traveling in interstate commerce). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 42 U.S.C.A § 16911 (West 2009). 
 88. See § 16918 (mandating that the public have internet access to a database of sexual 
offender registry information). 
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VI. POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS 
If the Court holds § 4248 unconstitutional, it is likely to do so by 
holding that Congress does not have power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate sexual dangerousness. In contrast, if the Court 
holds that § 4248 is constitutional, it will likely hold that civil 
commitment is a necessary and proper extension of Congress’ penal 
power. The Court might also rule that the government cannot civilly 
commit federal prisoners, but that the government can civilly commit 
those federal inmates deemed incompetent to stand trial because the 
government’s power to prosecute has not been exhausted. 
A. Ruling for Comstock: §4248 is Unconstitutional. 
If the Court deems § 4248 unconstitutional, it is likely to hold that 
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate sexually dangerous acts. Such a holding would rely on United 
States v. Morrison, which held that sexual violence is not economic in 
nature, and thus does not substantially effect interstate commerce.89 
Because §4248 appears to be an effort to prevent all sex crimes and 
not just federal sex crimes,90 using the logic of Morrison to review this 
law would inevitably lead to it being struck down. This is true even if 
the Court considers Raich, because, unlike illegal drugs, there is not a 
long history of federal regulation of sexual violence.91 
B. Ruling for the Government: §4248 Is Constitutional. 
If the Court finds that § 4248 is constitutional, it likely will hold 
that the power to civilly commit federal offenders is necessary and 
proper to the Government’s penal power. Like the accepted authority 
to provide terms of supervised release,92 civil commitment authority 
stands for the principle that the government has a responsibility to 
protect the public from people lawfully in its custody.93 Section 4248 
protects the public from federal prisoners likely to commit sexually 
violent crimes and serves the same preventative function as a prison 
sentence.94 In so holding, the Court will likely reason that a statute 
 89. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
 90. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d  274, 282 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 91. See Miles Coleman, supra note 36, at 1226 (discussing the unlikelihood of a 
congressional scheme to regulate sexually dangerous people in interstate markets). 
 92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 26. 
 93. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that “preventing danger 
to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal”). 
 94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2009). 
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can be a necessary and proper to a power that is accepted as a 
necessary and proper exercise of an enumerated power, such as that 
of the federal power to create a penal sy
C. Ruling Based on the Power to Prosecute. 
The Court might hold that the exercise of civil commitment 
depends on whether the government has exhausted its power to 
prosecute. The Supreme Court established in Greenwood v. United 
States that an offender can be committed to preserve the federal 
power to prosecute where the offender has been deemed mentally 
incompetent to stand trial but presents a danger to the interests of the 
United States.95 The Court might hold that §4248 lies outside the 
scope of Congressional authority only where the federal power to 
prosecute has been exhausted. If the Court rules this way, it would 
mean that the only sex offenders the government could civilly commit 
are those deemed incompetent to stand trial. Such a ruling would 
require, however, that the civil commitment serve the purpose of 
preserving the power to prosecute and not simply prevent danger to 
the community.96 If there were no chance that the offender would 
regain his competency, civil commitment would be unconstitutional 
under this holding, because the offender’s inability to regain 
competency means that the government would not retain any power 
to prosecute.97 
D. Disposition 
In deciding Comstock, the Supreme Court must find a way to 
balance competing interests. On one hand, the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision raises concerns about interference into legislative areas 
traditionally reserved for states. On the other, the federal 
government’s power to prosecute offenders is an important concern 
for national security, and consequently a power that has recently 
expanded.98 Though federalism has played a prominent role in 
American history,99 the trend toward expansion of federal criminal 
power points to a ruling in favor of the government. 
 95. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956). 
 96. See id at 375–76 (limiting the holding to the facts of the case and discussing the 
commitment as preserving the federal power to prosecute, not solely a preventative measure). 
 97. See id. (stating that a slim possibility of recovery is enough to preserve the power to 
prosecute). 
 98. Ehrlich, supra note 1 at 826–27. 
 99. Id. 
